China's 13th five-year plan running from 2016 – 2020 was expected to focus on enhance economic and market reforms first mooted in 2013 and is the first one approved by president Xi Jinping.

 

Two years ago, Xi appointed himself head of a new "leading group on comprehensively deepening reforms" to reform China's investment driven economy into one led by services and consumption.

 

Only the basic frameworks of programs and policies were issued yesterday by the communique and a more detailed plan would be revealed in March.

 

But there are already some implications: discouraged by gloomy economic growth, Xi and company, may be throttling some of those free-market reforms to re-drive the slowing economy with putting money on investment again.

 

From the latest communique,wording from 2013 mentioning the establishment of "a unified, open competitive and orderly market system" which would play a "decisive role in allocating resources" is gone. 

 

For the next five years "the country will prioritize quality and efficient development,"and government plans to "encourage better allocation of resources, but obviously it no longer meets up to market forces to complete this.

 

There is also a promise that "government will intervene less in price formation，Continuing to "raise consumption's contribution to growth" is still an important plank，a clear reference to its botched stock market meddling earlier this year.

 

But Beijing's decision to double-down on a long-stated commitment to "double 2010 GDP by 2020 and to develop urbanization at a faster pace and to persist its target of "medium-high economic growth"and " is the real kicker.

 

That 2020 GDP goal would require annual growth rates of 6.5%, the equivalent of adding an economy the size of Switzerland's every year going from a nominal $10 trillion last year to over $12 trillion in 2020. 

 

The party leaders look to suggest that such a Herculean task cannot be left to the market or services or consumption with the changes in information from 2013.

 

When growth begins to flag unavoidable, the Chinese government is likely to respond like they always do: energize local governments to undertake large projects, inject cash into the economy and mobilize state-owned enterprises for infrastructure investment.

 

China's consumption of metals have only grown from already elevated levels in 2008. It  is an open question about what this chart will look like in 2020 and no-one is predicting another China-induced supercycle. Today's doom and gloom about China's supposed loss of appetite for commodities is certainly overblown too.